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WHICH ULP IS IT?: AN EXAMINATION OF
RETALIATION UNDER SECTIONS 10(A)(1) AND
10(A)(2) OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC LABOR RELATIONS
ACT
By Helen J. Kim
Helen J. Kim is General Counsel for the Illinois Labor Relations Board. She earned a J.D. from the University of
Minnesota Law School and a B.S. in Mathematics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The views
expressed in this article are the author’s own and not of the State of Illinois or the Illinois Labor Relations Board.
Nothing in this article should be construed as an advisory opinion or official statement from the Illinois Labor
Relations Board or its agents.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Illinois Public Relations Act (IPLRA or Act)1 protects public sector employees
from retaliation by their employers for engaging in certain types of activity.2
Section 10(a) of the IPLRA, in relevant part, states:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer or its agents:
(1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in this Act or to dominate or
interfere with the formation, existence or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support
to it; provided, an employer shall not be prohibited from
permitting employees to confer with him during working
hours without loss of time or pay;
(2) to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment in order to encourage or
discourage membership in or other support for any labor
organization. Nothing in this Act or any other law precludes a
public employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment the
payment of a fair share under paragraph (e) of Section 6; . . .
When a public sector employee suffers an adverse employment action after
exercising rights guaranteed by the Act, is it a violation of Section 10(a)(1),
Section 10(a)(2), or both? A reading of Sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(2) suggests
that the two sections apply to different and distinct circumstances. The
distinction between the two sections is significant, for Section 10(a)(2) requires a
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determination of an employer’s specific intent for the complained-of conduct,
whereas such determination is not required under the broader language of
Section 10(a)(1). Without recognizing this distinction, the proper analysis cannot
be applied to determine whether the employer committed an unfair labor
practice.
Section 10(a)(1) generally applies in cases where the employer’s conduct
“interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerces” public employees in their exercise of
rights guaranteed by the Act.3 Proof of a public employer’s motive for its conduct
in such cases is generally not required.4 For example, where an employer
threatens retaliation for engaging in concerted activity, the Illinois Labor
Relations Board5 (Board) has evaluated the alleged violative conduct objectively
without consideration of the employer’s motive due to the nature of the conduct,
i.e., the threat.6 On the other hand, because Section 10(a)(2) expressly prohibits
discriminatory adverse employment actions taken for a specified motive—“to
encourage or discourage membership in or other support for any labor
organization,” i.e., antiunion animus, evaluation of an employer’s motive for the
alleged conduct is needed to demonstrate a violation.7
But for Section 10(a)(1) cases involving allegations that an employee suffered an
adverse employment action because the employee engaged in concerted activity,
the Board has evaluated the employer’s motive for the employment action
because unlike a threat where motive is readily apparent, the employer’s reasons
for discipline or the denial of a promotion may not be as obvious.8 To determine
motive, the Board has applied the burden-shifting analytical framework for
Section 10(a)(2) cases set forth in City of Burbank v. ISLRB,9 but without
consideration of the specific “anti-union animus” motivation.10 This article
examines the development of the analyses the Board and courts have applied to
retaliation cases in determining whether public employers have engaged in unfair
labor practices under Sections 10(a)(1) or 10(a)(2) of the Act.11

II.

RETALIATION: THE EARLY YEARS

Shortly after passage of the Act, the State and Local Boards considered under
Section 10(a)(1) and Section 10(a)(2), several cases involving public employers’
actions in response to employee organizing activity. These early State and Local
Board decisions illustrate the development of the analysis currently used in
retaliation cases under Sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(2) of the Act.
One of the earliest State Board cases, Village of Glendale Heights,12 involved the
Village’s actions toward James Gagnier, an employee who had actively
participated in efforts to organize the Village’s public services employees and
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eventually became steward for the union selected to represent the employees.13
Shortly after Gagnier became steward, the Village began enforcing its personnel
and safety rules strictly. It charged Gagnier with several rule violations which led
it to discipline him and to his eventual discharge.14
The hearing officer noted that where an employee exercises rights under the Act
but also violates the employer’s rules, allegations that the employer’s actions are
retaliatory involve both legitimate and illicit employer motives.15 Recognizing the
challenge posed by such “mixed motive” cases, the hearing officer examined the
approaches taken by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and at one time taken by by
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The hearing officer recommended
that the State Board adopt a similar approach under which conduct would be
deemed unlawful if an employer is motivated at least in part by an employee’s
protected activity.16 Following this approach, the hearing officer concluded the
Village was partly motivated by Gagnier’s participation in the union’s organizing
efforts and therefore violated Section 10(a)(2), and derivatively Section 10(a)(1)
of the Act.17 The hearing officer rejected the NLRB’s approach in Wright Line,
Inc.,18 which allows an employer an affirmative defense if it demonstrates it
would have taken the adverse action regardless of the employee’s protected
activity; instead, the hearing officer evaluated the Village’s alleged business
reasons—violation of its rules—to determine the appropriate remedy for the
violation.19 The hearing officer found the Village failed to demonstrate it would
have disciplined and discharged Gagnier regardless of his support for
unionization and concluded reinstatement with back pay appropriately remedied
the Village’s unlawful conduct.20
The State Board agreed with the hearing officer’s conclusion that the Village’s
actions against Gagnier violated Section 10(a)(2) of the Act but declined to adopt
the recommended “mixed motive” approach because it observed that the record
demonstrated the Village had no motive for its actions other than Gagnier’s union
activities.21 The State Board explained although it declined to follow the hearing
officer’s approach in this particular case, it understood that under the
recommended approach, the Wright Line analysis would be used to determine
the appropriate remedy rather than whether the conduct in question constituted
a violation.22
A few weeks later, the State Board again had occasion to consider applying the
“mixed motive” approach recommended by the hearing officer in Village of
Glendale Heights in a case involving another public employer’s alleged retaliatory
conduct. In State of Illinois Department of Central Management Services.
(Morgan) (CMS/Morgan),23 Gerald Morgan, a correctional officer working at the
State of Illinois’s Lincoln Correctional Center, was contacted by an internal
investigator so that he could be interviewed in connection with an investigation
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into an inmate escape.24 Morgan refused to answer the investigator’s questions
without the presence of a union representative and was later discharged for
refusing to cooperate in the investigation.25 The State Board recognized Morgan’s
request for union representation during the investigatory interview, i.e., rights
under the Weingarten doctrine,26 as a right inherent in Section 6 of the Act and
further determined the State discharged Morgan because he exercised those
rights.27 Agreeing with the hearing officer’s conclusion that the State’s conduct
violated Section 10(a)(1), the State Board noted: “If [an employer] disciplines
[an] employee for refusing to continue in the absence of representation the
employer is, in effect, retaliating against the employee because he has engaged in
protected concerted activity, and such conduct is clearly violative of Section
10(a)(1).”28
Notably, the State Board, recognizing the State’s right to demand accurate
reporting in the tightly controlled and secured environment of a correctional
center, re-considered the “mixed motive” approach it declined to take under the
circumstances in Village of Glendale Heights.29 To balance an employer’s interest
in enforcing rules of conduct with an employee’s rights under the Act, the State
Board established a framework to determine whether an employer has engaged in
an unfair labor practice in cases where the allegations involve employee
misconduct, but the employer’s actions were motivated, at least in part, by the
employee’s participation in protected activity:30
When a Charging Party demonstrates that an adverse
employment action was motivated, at least in part, by
his having engaged in protected activities, we will find a
violation of the Act, which will raise a presumption that
the standard make whole remedy is appropriate. To
rebut this presumption, the burden will be upon the
employer to demonstrate that the same action would
have been taken for legitimate reasons even in the
absence of the protected activities. If the employer fully
meets this burden in a discharge situation, it will not be
required to grant the Charging Party reinstatement and
back pay. Rather, the only remedy will be the posting of
a notice.31
Several State Board decisions followed this analysis in cases where both
legitimate and illicit motives were present.32 In one such case, County of Peoria,33
the State Board determined a party alleging an employer’s retaliatory conduct
amounts to a violation of the Act must establish four elements: “(1) union or
protected concerted activity, (2) employer knowledge of such activity, (3) animus
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toward such activity, and (4) an adverse employment action under suspect
circumstances.”34
Meanwhile the Local Board, in Chicago Housing Authority (Gale),35 looked to
NLRB precedent but took a slightly different approach towards retaliation cases,
focusing on the language of Section 10(a)(1). Noting the similarity between
Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)36 and
Sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(2) of the Act, the Local Board observed that the
comparable sections of the Act should be interpreted in the same fashion as the
NLRA sections “such that proof of anti-union animus is generally necessary to
make out a Section 10(a)(2) violation.”37 The inquiry, however, did not end there
for the Local Board. In the absence of anti-union animus, the Board focused on
an objective standard, examining whether the employer’s actions had the effect of
coercing, restraining, or interfering with employees’ rights under the Act rather
than examining whether the employer was improperly motivated to take the
complained-of action.38
In Chicago Housing Authority (Gale), Mikel Gale, a fireman with the Chicago
Housing Authority, alleged he was harassed, disciplined, denied a promotion,
and finally discharged, because he filed grievances over alleged mistreatment by
his supervisors.39 The hearing officer, citing American Freightways Co.40 and
NLRB v. Haberman Construction Co.,41 concluded that retaliation against an
employee for filing grievances was “inherently destructive” of employee rights
because it “unambiguously penalizes and deters that protected activity.”42 The
Local Board upheld the hearing officer’s conclusion that by harassing and
disciplining Gale for filing grievances, the CHA’s actions effectively restrained
employees from exercising their rights under the Act in violation of Section
10(a)(1), but found that the same conduct did not violate Section 10(a)(2).43
Explaining the “inherently destructive” analysis applies only as a substitute for
motive in the context of Section 10(a)(2), the Local Board found no evidence of
antiunion motive where the complained of conduct stemmed from personal
animosity rather than intent to encourage or discourage membership or other
support for a labor organization.44
This analysis was applied in City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department
(Kostro).45 In that case, James Kostro, a police officer, claimed the City
committed an unfair labor practice when it disciplined him for filing a grievance.
The City claimed Kostro was disciplined for failing to comply with department
rules. The hearing officer found that, although the City was partly motivated by
Kostro’s grievance filing, regardless of the City’s reasons for disciplining Kostro,
the City’s conduct interfered with Kostro’s exercise of his rights under the Act, in
this case his filing of a grievance.46 The Local Board adopted the hearing officer’s
conclusion that the City of Chicago violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act.47
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III. RETALIATION ANALYSIS UNDER SECTION 10(a)(2)
ADOPTED IN COURT CASES
As discussed above, the analytical framework set forth in CMS/Morgan was
followed in subsequent cases involving retaliation until modified by the Illinois
Appellate Court’s decision in County of Menard v. ISLRB.48 In County of
Menard, the court reviewed the State Board’s decision in County of Menard
(II),49 the second of three State Board decisions involving the discharge of a
County of Menard employee50.
The County of Menard State Board cases concerned an unfair labor practice
charge filed by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME) alleging the County discharged one of its
employees, Donald Witherall, in retaliation for his support of AFSCME’s
organizing campaign. The State Board in County of Menard (I),51 adopted the
hearing officer’s findings of fact but reversed his conclusion that the discharge
was proper. The hearing officer had determined the discharge was proper
because he found no evidence of animus or illegal motivation on the part of the
County board members who voted to discharge Witherall.52 The State Board
disagreed and remanded the matter for a determination of whether Witherall’s
supervisor was illegally motivated by Witherall’s unionizing efforts when he
recommended Witherall’s discharge to County board members.53
On remand, the hearing officer determined the supervisor was, at least in part,
illegally motivated in recommending Witherall’s discharge.54 Following the
framework set forth in CMS/Morgan,55 the hearing officer, after finding the
discharge violated the Act, determined reinstatement with backpay to be the
appropriate remedy because the County failed to demonstrate that Witherall
would have been discharged regardless of his union activities.56 In County of
Menard (II), the State Board adopted the hearing officer’s recommendations on
remand concluding that the County unlawfully discharged Witherall, and finding
reinstatement with backpay to be the appropriate remedy.57
The County petitioned the Illinois Appellate Court to review the State Board’s
County of Menard (II) decision, urging the court to adopt the NLRB’s Wright
Line analysis.58 The Fourth District found the County’s arguments persuasive. In
County of Menard v. ISLRB, 59 the court affirmed the denial of the County’s
attempt to relitigate certain representation issues but reversed the State Board’s
determination that the discharge was improper and remanded with instructions
to apply the Wright Line analysis to the facts in the case.60
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The court questioned the State Board’s analysis adopted in CMS/Morgan,61
reasoning that the approach followed a minority view which the court rejected in
Hardin County Educ. Ass’n. v. IELRB,62 and created an irrebuttable presumption
wherein an employer could never disprove a violation.63 The court further noted
that the Wright Line analysis had been applied by the Second District in
Rockford Township Highway Dep’t. v. ISLRB,64 and by the court in Hardin
County Education Ass’n. v. IELRB,65 which found the approach in Wright Line
appropriately balanced competing interests in discriminatory discharges cases
under Section 14(a)(3) of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act,66 a section
analogous to Section 10(a)(2) of the Act.67
The court held that the party alleging an unfair labor practice under Section
10(a)(2) of the Act must establish a prima facie case that the employer was
motivated to take action against an employee because the employee engaged in
protected activity.68 Once established, the burden shifts to the employer to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken action against the
employee even absent the employee’s participation in protected activity.69 If the
employer meets this burden, there is no violation of the Act.70 The court
concluded by remanding the case to the State Board with instructions to apply
the Wright Line analysis. On remand, Board applied the Wright Line analysis in
County of Menard (III),71 finding the County violated Sections 10(a)(1) and
10(a)(2) of the Act and adopting the Wright Line analysis for future cases.72
Shortly after the Fourth District’s decision, the Illinois Supreme Court in City of
Burbank v. ISLRB,73 solidified the adoption of the Wright Line burden-shifting
analysis for cases involving retaliation against employees who exercised their
rights under the Act.74 Unlike the conduct in the County of Menard cases, the
retaliatory action against the employee in City of Burbank did not involve
allegations of employee misconduct. Rather, the State Board in City of Burbank
was confronted with an employee discharge resulting from the City’s
reorganization of its Public Works department.75
Two days before the State Board certified AFSCME Council 31 as the exclusive
representative of employees working in the City of Burbank’s Public Works
Department, the City of Burbank reorganized the department, eliminating two
foreman positions and replacing them with one newly created Deputy Director of
Public Works.76 As a result of this reorganization, Robert Randle, a foreman and
AFSCME supporter during AFSCME’s organization campaign, was laid off.77
Norbert Maza, the other foreman who had previously voiced opposition to
AFSCME’s organization efforts on at least one occasion, was placed into the
newly created Deputy Director position.78
The State Board observed that the City of Burbank’s reorganization was
specifically designed to exclude the foreman positions from collective bargaining
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in response to its unsuccessful objection to AFSCME’s petition to represent a
bargaining unit comprising public works employees, including the two foreman
positions. 79 The State Board noted that the City actively sought to exclude the
two foreman positions as supervisors, was aware of Randle’s testimony at the
representation hearing that he wished to be included in the unit, and challenged
Randle’s ballot after the State Board determined the positions were not
supervisory and directed an election.80 The State Board also observed that the
City filed a unit clarification petition to exclude the deputy director position but
that petition was dismissed.81 Thus, the State Board concluded, the City engaged
in a pattern of conduct intended to circumvent the Act’s grant of rights to public
employees and engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Sections 10(a)(1),
10(a)(2) and 10(a)(3) of the Act.82
In City of Burbank v. ISLRB,83 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District
affirmed the State Board’s decision, rejecting the City of Burbank’s appeal that
the State Board decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.84 The
court identified the central issue in the case was whether Randle’s termination
was motivated by antiunion animus and concluded that circumstantial evidence
supported the State Board’s decision finding the City’s reorganization was a
pretext for antiunion animus.85 The court determined that motive was a question
of fact and that circumstantial evidence such as the employer’s knowledge of an
employee’s union activities, the proximity in time between the union activity and
the adverse employment action, and the employer’s conduct, can be used to
establish an unfair labor practice.86
The City of Burbank appealed the appellate court’s decision to the Illinois
Supreme Court. In City of Burbank v. ISLRB,87 the supreme court affirmed the
appellate court’s decision, setting forth the burden-shifting analysis to be used in
retaliation cases under Section 10(a)(2) of the Act.88 The court held that the
employee claiming an unfair labor practice under Section 10(a)(2) must first
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer was motivated to
take adverse action against the employee because that employee participated in
union activities.89 The court observed that motive is a question of fact that can be
demonstrated through direct or circumstantial evidence. 90 Citing federal
precedent, the court observed that antiunion motivation can be inferred from
evidence of the employer’s hostility towards unionization together with the
employer’s knowledge of the employee’s participation in organizing efforts;91 the
proximity in time between the alleged adverse action and the employee’s union
activities;92 disparate treatment or targeting of known union supporters for
adverse actions;93 and inconsistencies in the employer’s proffered reasons for the
adverse action or shifting reasons for its adverse actions.94
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Once motivation for the adverse action is established, the burden shifts to the
employer to prove it took the adverse action for legitimate reasons and that the
employer would have taken the action despite the employee’s union activities.95
In affirming the appellate court’s decision, the supreme court noted two points in
the appellate court’s analysis requiring clarification to avoid confusion in future
cases.96 The supreme court observed the appellate court proceeded to a “dual
motive” analysis before determining whether the City of Burbank’s proffered
reasons for discharging Randle were indeed legitimate, i.e., bona fide, even
though the “dual motive” analysis necessarily requires proof there was a lawful
motive in addition to the alleged unlawful one.97 The supreme court also viewed
the appellate court’s determination that evidence of the City of Burbank’s
knowledge of Randle’s union activities or the City’s pattern of conduct was
sufficient to support a violation, as a departure from federal precedent requiring
a showing of the employer’s knowledge 0f an employee’s union activities in
addition to evidence of the employer’s hostility towards union organizing.98

IV.

RETALIATION UNDER SECTION 10(a)(1) OF THE ACT

After the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in City of Burbank, both State and
Local Boards issued decisions applying the analysis from Section 10(a)(2) of the
Act to evaluate allegations of employer retaliatory conduct arising under Section
10(a)(1).99 In each case, the boards found that the nature of retaliatory conduct
required a determination of motive but found that the objective test provided an
inadequate means to arrive at that determination. The boards found the analysis
used to evaluate conduct under Section 10(a)(2) set forth in City of Burbank,
which required a showing of motive, provided the appropriate method to
determine whether the conduct coerced, restrained or interfered with employee
rights under the Act.100
In Chicago Housing Authority (Kirk),101 the Local Board dismissed allegations
that the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) retaliated against William Kirk, a
janitor in its employ and steward for his union, Service Employees International
Union, Local 1, in violation of Section 10(a)(1) of the Act.102 Kirk claimed the CHA
denied his transfer grievance and then denied his bids for promotion because he
filed grievances on his own behalf and on behalf of others in his bargaining unit,
and because he served as a union steward.103 The hearing officer concluded
CHA’s conduct did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act because the CHA had
justifiable reasons for denying Kirk’s transfer grievance and promotional bids,
even though the CHA’s actions were against Kirk’s interest.104
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The Local Board adopted the hearing officer’s conclusion that the CHA’s actions
did not violate Section 10(a)(1) but modified the analysis applied.105 It
distinguished the allegations in the case before it from “one involving a threat or
question which may be evaluated as to whether it would reasonably have had the
effect of coercing, restraining or interfering with the exercise of protected
rights.”106 It observed that allegations that employer actions “were committed
against [an employee] because of, and in retaliation for” an employee’s exercise
of rights guaranteed by the Act, require a determination that the employer’s
“action was in fact illegally motivated.”107 As such, the Local Board found the
objective test articulated in prior Local Board cases,108 which does not consider
motive but evaluates whether conduct “had the effect of coercing, restraining or
interfering with the exercise of protected rights,” inadequately assessed the
nature of the retaliatory conduct to determine whether such retaliatory conduct
violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act.109 Thus, the Local Board found the analysis
“must track” the analysis used in evaluating cases arising under Section 10(a)(2)
of the Act.110 Applying this analysis, the Local Board found CHA’s actions did not
violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act because the CHA advanced legitimate business
reasons for its actions against Kirk, and Kirk failed to demonstrate those reasons
were pretextual.111
Following the Local Board’s reasoning regarding the “objective test,” the State
Board in County of Jersey (Lewis and McAdams),112 likewise applied the
framework under Section 10(a)(2) to determine whether the adverse employment
actions at issue violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act.113 In that case, Don Lewis and
Michael McAdams, employees of the County of Jersey Highway Department,
alleged the County of Jersey unlawfully laid them off and eventually discharged
them in retaliation for filing a grievance raising perceived safety concerns.114
Because there was no evidence that the County of Jersey discriminated against
Lewis and McAdams based on their union membership, the State Board found no
violation arising under Section 10(a)(2) but concluded the County of Jersey
retaliated against them based on their grievance activity in violation of Section
10(a)(1) of the Act.115
Like the Local Board found in Chicago Housing Authority (Kirk),116 the State
Board determined the objective test to be inadequate in evaluating retaliatory
conduct under Section 10(a)(1) because the nature of retaliatory conduct
necessarily required an examination of motive, The State Board thus found a
Section 10(a)(2)-type analysis to be applicable.117 It also found that a Section
10(a)(2)-type analysis was appropriate because “union activity” and “protected
concerted activity” are both protected under the Act, and so reprisals based on
either activity would be prohibited.118 The State Board determined that the
employees established the elements of a prima facie case used in County of
Peoria,119 finding three elements—protected concerted activity, the employer’s
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knowledge of that activity, and an adverse employment action—were undisputed
and that the adverse action was taken under suspect circumstances.120 In so
finding, the State Board determined suspect circumstances existed based on
evidence of the employer’s expression of hostility or animus toward the
employees’ grievances, which suggested a causal connection between the
employees’ layoff and discharge and the protected concerted activity.121 The State
Board then found the County of Jersey’s reasons for the layoff and discharge were
pretexts for its illegal motive and concluded the County of Jersey vi0lated Section
10(a)(1) of the Act. 122
The application of the Section 10(a)(2) analysis to retaliation cases under Section
10(a)(1) was further settled in Pace Suburban Bus Division of the Regional
Transportation Authority v. ILRB, Local Panel.123 In the underlying Board
decision, the Local Panel adopted the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) findings
and conclusions that PACE Northwest Division (Pace) committed unfair labor
practices in violation of Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it discharged one of its
employees for participating in protected concerted activity.124 The employee,
Urszula Panikowski, a bus operator employed by Pace, alleged she was
discharged in retaliation for her successful grievance of an earlier discharge and
resulting reinstatement.125
Because the allegations involved retaliation for Panikowski’s grievance filing, i.e.,
concerted activity, the ALJ determined they should be analyzed as retaliation
under Section 10(a)(1) of the Act and, following the Board’s decisions in County
of Jersey and Chicago Housing Authority (Kirk), applied the Section 10(a)(2)
burden-shifting analysis, substituting “protected concerted activity in the 10(a)(1)
analysis for union activity.”126 The ALJ concluded Panikowski met her burden by
establishing: (1) she engaged in protected concerted activity by filing and
prevailing in her grievance over her prior discharge; (2) the decision-makers in
her discharge at issue were aware of her successful grievance and resulting
reinstatement; and (3) a causal connection between her protected concerted
activity and her current discharge though circumstantial evidence of the
employer’s shifting reasons for her current discharge.127 After finding Panikowski
established a prima facie case, the ALJ shifted the burden to PACE to
demonstrate it would have discharged Panikowski in the absence of her
successful grievance of her prior discharge and determined Pace failed to satisfy
its burden, thus concluding Pace violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act.128
Pace petitioned the Illinois Appellate Court to review the Local Panel’s decision,
contending, inter alia, that the Board erred by sustaining a violation without a
demonstration of antiunion animus.129 The court affirmed the Board’s decision,
specifically rejecting Pace’s argument that proof of antiunion animus is required
to establish a violation under Section 10(a)(1).130 The court found that to establish
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retaliation under Section 10(a)(1), an employee must demonstrate “retaliation for
engaging in activities protected by the Act, regardless of whether it is considered
union activity or the [adverse action] was otherwise motivated by antiunion
animus.”131 Recognizing that Section 10(a)(1) in general does not require a
demonstration of an improper motive, the court observed that when employees
claim their employers took an adverse employment action against them, they
necessarily claim their employer acted with an illegal motive.132 The court further
recognized that Section 10(a)(1) broadly protects employees’ rights under the Act,
whereas Section 10(a)(2) provides narrower protection from adverse employment
actions based on union membership and activities.133
Agreeing with the Board’s contention, the court determined a prima facie case of
retaliation under Section 10(a)(1) requires employees to demonstrate: (1) they
engaged in protected concerted activity; (2) their employer was aware of the
nature of their activity; and (3) the employer took an adverse employment action
against them for “discriminatory reasons, i.e., animus toward [their]
participation in such activities.”134 The court found Pace’s reliance on the Illinois
Supreme Court’s decision in City of Burbank misplaced, noting the language of
the supreme court’s holding in that case indicated that a showing of either
antiunion animus or that the employee’s protected activity was a substantial or
motivating factor would support a finding of an unfair labor practice.135 The court
also found support for this interpretation of the supreme court’s holding in the
Fifth District’s decision in Sheriff of Jackson County v. ISLRB,136 its decision in
Speed District 802 v. Warning,137 and in federal precedent.138 The court reasoned
that requiring a showing of antiunion animus in addition to proving the employer
was motivated to take an adverse action because the employee participated in
activity protected by the Act, places an undue burden on employees.139

V.

CONCLUSION

The answer to the question “which ULP is it?” or whether the conduct at issue
violates Section 10(a)(1) or Section 10(a)(2) appears to depend on the
circumstances surrounding the alleged violative conduct and motive. Section
10(a)(2) prohibits a public employer from discriminating in employment actions
based on support for a labor organization. As such, many of the cases where the
Board has found violations of Section 10(a)(2) involved employee participation in
union organizing efforts or other circumstances demonstrating the employer
acted against employees with anti-union animus, i.e., to “discourage or
encourage” support for a labor organization.
Because Section 10(a)(2) requires a specific motive—to encourage or discourage
support for a union—it follows that retaliatory conduct will not constitute a
violation of that section in the absence of evidence of anti-union animus. As the
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above discussion suggests, the absence of anti-union motivation may defeat a
violation under Section 10(a)(2) of the Act, but it does not end the inquiry for
retaliatory conduct may still constitute a violation of Section 10(a)(1) which
broadly prohibits conduct that “interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerces”
participation in concerted activity.
When an employer denies an individual employee rights or threatens or prevents
the employee from exercising rights guaranteed by the Act, such as filing a
grievance or invoking Weingarten rights, motive is not a consideration because
the conduct on its face would be a violation of Section 10(a)(1). In such cases, the
Board has applied an objective test to evaluate whether the conduct violates
Section 10(a)(1). But the Board in Chicago Housing Authority (Kirk)140 and
County of Jersey,141 recognizing the inadequacy of the objective test in evaluating
an employer’s retaliatory conduct, considered the employer’s motive for its
actions. To determine if the employer acted with an improper motive, the Board
applied the burden-shifting analysis used in Section 10(a)(2)-type cases,
substituting the narrower anti-union support motive for a broader “anti-“
concerted activity motive. If an employee can demonstrate the employer took
action against them because they engaged in concerted activity, Section 10(a)(1)
may provide protection from adverse employment actions without having to
show the employer’s “anti-union” animus.

1

5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 2018).

22
3

See 5 ILCS 315/10(a) (West 2018).

5 ILCS 315/10(a)(1) (West 2018).

See State of Ill., Dep’t of Central Mgmt. Servs. (Serio), 2 PERI 2032 (ISLRB 1986) (finding that evidence
of employer’s intent to affect employees’ exercise of rights under the Act was not required); Chicago
Housing Authority (Kirk), 6 PERI ¶ 3013 (ILLRB 1990).

4

Pub. Act 91-798 (eff. Jul. 9, 2000) dissolved both the State Labor Relations Board (State Board) and the
Local Labor Relations Board (Local Board), creating in their places the State Panel and Local Panel of the
Illinois Labor Relations Board. For decisions pre-dating the dissolution of the State and Local Boards, this
article will specify the board that issued the decision in the text.

5

See, e.g., Township of Worth, 3 PERI ¶ 2019 (ISLRB 1987) (finding that interrogation of employee about
union activities and threats of retaliation against Township employees for union activity interfered with
employee rights under the Act in violation Section 10(a)(1)); see also Chicago Housing Authority (Gale), 1
PERI 3010 (ILLRB 1985) (concluding that employer’s retaliation against employee for filing grievances
deters protected activity in violation of Section 10(a)(1)).
6

5 ILCS 315/10(a)(2); see City of Burbank v. ISLRB, 128 Ill.2d 335, 345-47, 538 N.E.2d 1146, 1149-50
(1989); see also Pace Suburban Bus Div. of Reg’l Transp. Auth. v. ILRB, 406 Ill. App. 3d 484, 493-95,
942 N.E.2d 652, 660-61 (1st Dist. 2010) (citing City of Chicago (Mulligan), 11 PERI ¶ 3008 (ILLRB 1995)
7
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(requiring showing employer discriminated against employee based on union membership or union
support)).
8

See Chicago Housing Authority (Kirk), 6 PERI ¶ 3013 (ILLRB 1990).

9

128 Ill.2d 335, 538 N.E.2d 1146 (1989).

Chicago Housing Authority (Kirk), 6 PERI ¶ 3013 (ILLRB 1990); County of Jersey, 7 PERI ¶ 2023
(ISLRB 1991), aff’d sub nom. County of Jersey v. ISLRB, No. 4-91-0462, 8 PERI ¶ 4015, 1992 WL
12647448 (4th Dist. 1992).
10

11 The analysis for Section 10(a)(1) retaliation cases considers alleged conduct as a direct violation of that
section rather than as a derivative violation of another part of Section 10(a) of the Act. See, e.g., County of
Peoria, 3 PERI ¶ 2028 (ISLRB 1987) (finding employer’s retaliatory conduct violated Section 10(a)(2) and
derivatively, Section 10(a)(1) of the Act); cf. Chicago Housing Authority (Gale), 1 PERI ¶ 3010 (ILLRB
1985) (noting that conduct violating the narrower protections of Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA may
establish a derivative violation of the broader Section 8(a)(1)).
12

1 PERI ¶ 2019 (ISLRB 1985).

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

Id. (citing Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass’n, 224 NLRB 574 (1976); Wisc. Dep’t of Emp’t Relations
v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 122 Wis.2d 132, 361 N.W.2d 660 (1985); Muskego-Norway C.S.J.S.D.
No. 9 v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Bd., 35 Wis. 2d 540, 151 N.W.2d 617 (1967)).
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Id.

251 NLRB 1083 (1980); the Supreme Court approved the Wright Line approach in NLRB v.
Transportation Management. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
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See Village of Glendale Heights, 1 PERI ¶ 2019 (ISLRB 1985).

20

See id.
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Id.
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Id. (Board decision, n.1).

23

1 PERI ¶ 2020 (ISLRB 1985).

24

Id.

25

Id.

The United States Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975) and N.L.R.B. v.
Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975) recognized an employee’s right under the National Labor Relations
Act to refuse to submit to an employer’s investigatory interview without the presence of a union
representative.

26

27

Ill. Dep’t. of Central Mgmt. Servs. (Gerald Morgan), 1 PERI ¶ 2020 (ISLRB 1985).
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Id. (emphasis in the original). Although the decision cites Section 10(a)(2), this appears to be
inadvertent, as the State Board noted it was approving the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that the conduct
violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act. See id.
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1 PERI ¶ 2019 (ISLRB 1985).

30

Ill. Dep’t. of Central Mgmt. Servs. (Gerald Morgan), 1 PERI ¶ 2020 (ISLRB 1985).
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177 Ill. App. 3d 139, 531 N.E.2d 1080 (4th Dist. 1988).

3 PERI ¶ 2058 (ISLRB 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. County of Menard v.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By Student Editorial Board:

Patrick J. Foote, Mayra Gomez, Michael P. Halpin, Matt Soaper
I.

IELRA Developments
A.

Duty of Fair Representation

In Bowles v. Elmhurst Teachers Council, West Suburban Teachers Union,
IFT-AFT, 36 PERI ¶ 58 (IELRB 2019), the IELRB upheld its Executive
Director’s dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge which alleged that
the union breached its duty of fair representation when it failed to file a
grievance of unfair labor practice charge challenging the charging party’s
receipt of a letter of notice in her personnel file.
On December 3, 2018, Michele C. Bowles, a teacher, filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the IELRB alleging that Elmhurst Teachers Council,
West Suburban Teachers Union, Local 571, IFT-AFT committed unfair
labor practices when it failed to represent her during meetings with
Elmhurst Community Unit School District 205 that resulted in a letter or
notice in her personnel file. Sometime after filing her initial charge, Bowles
ran for union president and submitted additional evidence to the IELRB
not available during the initial investigation. Bowles maintained that
statements made by the incumbent president on his campaign website and
in emails to union members criticizing Bowles for filing the charge
indicated that the incumbent was a significant reason why the union
decided to not file a grievance on her behalf. Bowles also submitted the
incumbent’s answers to union members’ questions in which he criticized
Bowles for her conduct when she served as union vice-president.
The Executive Director reasoned that the union’s conduct in the context of
a union election is an internal union matter over which the “IELRB ha[d]
no jurisdiction unless there was an impact on or nexus to a charging party’s
employment conditions.” Since there was no such nexus in this case, the
IELRB had no jurisdiction. Furthermore, even if the IELRB had
jurisdiction, there was no correlation between the former union president’s
comments and the union’s decision to not act on behalf of Bowles.
Bowles filed exceptions claiming that (1) the union refused her requests to
meet with her in violation of its duty of fair representation and that (2) the
union’s failure to provide evidence that it met and discussed the appeal of
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the District’s decision regarding the letter of notice in her file established
that it breached its duty of fair representation.
The IELRB concluded that the record did not support the contention that
the union refused to meet with Bowles because the union submitted emails
from the incumbent to Bowles in which he invited her to meet with him to
discuss concerns regarding her disciplinary action. Additionally, the IELRB
concluded that the absence of evidence that the union met and discussed
Bowles’ appeal did not establish a breach of its duty of fair representation.
The IELRB reasoned that a union has wide discretion in in representing the
bargaining unit and there is no requirement that discretion be exercised by
a group of officials rather than just one or two. The Board affirmed the
Executive Director’s dismissal of the unfair labor practice charge.
B.

Unfair Labor Practice Charge Timeliness

In Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, IFT-AFT and Chicago Board of
Education, 36 PERI ¶ 43 (IELRB 2019), the IELRB held that an unfair
labor practice charge filed by the Chicago Teacher’s Union against the
Chicago Board of Education more than six months after the alleged unfair
labor practice was untimely. Consequently, the charge alleging that the
Chicago Board of Education violated Sections 14(a)(3) and derivatively (1)
of the IELRA was dismissed in its entirety.
During the spring of 2017, two probationary teachers, Witwoski and
Miglietta, were involved in organizing and circulating a letter to the Uplift
Local School Council (LSC) and office of CBE Network 2 that expressed a
lack of confidence in the school principal. In December 2017, Miglietta was
involved in organizing a meeting at the Chicago Grassroots Curriculum
Taskforce to discuss concerns about poor administrative leadership and its
negative impact on students, teachers, and the school. The principal issued
pre-disciplinary notices in January 2018. The notices accused Witowski of
being tardy and Miglietta of not complying with Uplift’s lesson plan.
The principal then issued a second pre-disciplinary notice to Miglietta
accusing him of verbally humiliating a new staff member. On June 1, 2018
the two received correspondence indicating their appointments would not
be renewed. They received “unsatisfactory” summative evaluation ratings
on September 21, 2018. The Chicago Teachers’ Union filed the unfair labor
practice charge on March 1, 2019.

Fall 2019

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

25

The IELRB held that the six-month charge-filing period began to run when
Witowski and Miglietta received the letters on June 1, 2019, notifying them
that their appointments were not being renewed. The IELRB additionally
found Witowski and Miglietta’s receipt of lowered summative evaluations
on September 21, 2018 was inconsequential because they should have
known of the Chicago Board of Education’s alleged retaliatory conduct from
the June 1 letters. Because the charge was filed more than six months after
June 1, 2018, the IELRB dismissed it as untimely.
II.

IPLRA Developments
A.

Duty to Bargain

In Policemen’s Benevolent Labor Committee, and County of Cook and
Sheriff of Cook County, 36 PERI ¶ 54 (ILRB Local Panel 2019), the ILRB
Local Panel overruled its ALJ and held that the union waived its right to
bargain over the effects of the Sheriff’s decision to lay off 18 lieutenants.
In 2017, the union and Cook County Sheriff’s office were approaching the
expiration date of their current collective bargaining agreement. They had
agreed to extend the terms of the previous contract until they reached a
new agreement. In November of that year, the Sherriff’s office informed the
union that of the need to lay off 18 lieutenants. The Sherriff’s office and
union met multiple times over the next few months to bargain over the
effects of the layoff and to find a solution to avoid the layoffs. During these
meetings, the Sherriff’s office agreed to delay the layoffs by about a month
and extend the recall rights of the lieutenants.
The ALJ found that, while the Sherriff’s office had no obligation to bargain
over the decision, it still violated Section 10(a)(4) and 10(a)(1) because it
did not bargain in good faith over the effects. The ALJ found that the layoff
decision was implemented before impasse was reached in effects
bargaining, as the final effects bargaining session occurred a few days after
implementation. The Local Panel rejected the ALJ’s findings. The ILRB
observed that the union sought to bargain over the effective date of the
layoffs, the lieutenants’ compensatory time and seniority after the layoffs
and the assignment and reassignment of lieutenants not laid off. The ILRB
stated that the layoff date is an “an inevitable consequence of the layoff
decision itself.” Therefore, the Sherriff’s office did not have to bargain over
this issue and could proceed with the layoffs on the date of its choosing. The
Local Panel further found that compensatory time and seniority were
covered by the existing collective bargaining agreement and, therefore,

26

LLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

Fall 2019

there was no duty to bargain further over these issues. As for assignment
and reassignment, the ILRB found that the contract gave the Sheriff the
right to make work assignments and determine the number of personnel
needed to carry out the office’s duties. The ILRB held that the union clearly
and unequivocally waived its right to bargain over this issue.

In North Riverside Fire Fighters, Local 2714 and Village of North
Riverside, 36 PERI ¶56 (ILRB State Panel 2019), the State Panel held that
the Village violated Section 10(a)(4) by failing to maintain the status quo
while interest arbitration proceedings were pending.
On March 14, 2018, North Riverside Fire Fighters Local 2714 filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the Village of North Riverside alleging that the
Village violated Sections 10(a)(4) and (1) of the Act when it changed the
health insurance of newly-hired firefighters during the pendency of impasse
resolution proceedings. The Village argued that the health insurance that it
provided to newly hired firefighters was “substantially equal, as the
contract required.”
The instant charges arose out of a longstanding contract battle. The parties’
collective bargaining agreement expired in 2014. After months of
negotiation, the parties requested mediation with the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service. After that failed, the union filed for interest
arbitration. The union then filed charges alleging that the Village engaged
in “surface bargaining over a proposal to privatize its fire department.”
When the Village sent the union a letter “purporting to terminate the
collective bargaining agreement and the employment of all firefighters,” the
union filed an unfair labor practice charge. It was determined that the
Village had violated the IPLRA. The parties were still working under the
expired collective bargaining agreement.
The administrative law judge found, and the State Panel agreed, that the
change to the health insurance for new employees constituted a failure to
maintain the status quo during the pendency of interest arbitration
hearings and was a violation of the Act. “The test for determining whether a
practice is sufficiently established to constitute the status quo requires a
determination of four factors, (1) the parties’ past history, (2) their past
bargaining practices, (3) the terms of the existing collective bargaining
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agreement, and (4) the reasonable expectations of employees.” The
language of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement allowed the
Respondent to change health insurance plans as long as the benefits were
“substantially equal.” The ALJ determined, among other things, that the
new plan “significantly increase[d] employees’ up-front costs.” What’s
more, the Respondent’s agents had implicitly acknowledged that the there
was “a significant disparity” between the plans and that conduct “fostered
employees’ reasonable expectations that [the new plans] were not
substantially equal to [the old] plan and that the Respondent therefore
would not unilaterally substitute” one for the other.

